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APPLICATION AND FINDING OF LAW 
TSUNE ONOGI 
I 
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u茄五託苦百T古r陽 now. These two questions are indeed very important for 
men of legal profession. .It may be said that their chief activity 
is to apply and find law. This applies not only to men of legal 
profession in the judicial field， such as judges and la wyers， but 
also under the doctrine of rule of law to 0缶cersin the admini帽
strative field， at least about bindingadministrative measures. They 
always perforrn application and finding of law at the management 
of concrete cases. Now， what meaning have application of law 
and finding of it in connection with the settlements of civil dis帽
putes? 1 should like to think over this question， limiting to civil 
cases， as a part of the study about the logic of sett1ing civi1 disputes 
or that of decision. It wi1 be possible and significant to take this 
question from the standpoint of legal science of general proceedings， 
which undertakes the basis comrrion to both civi1 and criminal 
suits; but 1 do not consider the latter， because there is restraint 
by the doctrine of nulla poena sine lege about criminal case， and 
also because it is not the subject of my special study. 
II 
Firsi of al， what meaning application and finding of law have 
been thought to have so far， concerning the sett1ements of civi1 
disputes， may be answered as follows. The sei t1ements of civi1 
disputes which are mentioned here involve both compulsory settle-
ment by decision and voluntary one by compromise agreements， 
conci1iation and award. Finding of law is chiefly discussed about 
the latter in the meaning thai they are not settlements by'"law ヘ
on the contrary application of law is discussed about the former. 
There is no need of mentioning here. that the logic of syllo・
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gism has been considered about decision， above al1， judgement， and 
that severe criticism has been given for such thought especial1y 
from the side of“freie Reehtswissenschaftぺ Now，legal syl10gism 
has the fol1owing structure. A code is considered a col1ection of 
legal rules， and a legal rule is consisted of legal condition and legal 
e百ect，and further legal condi tion can be analysed into legal facts. 
It is what our righteousness requires that at the settlements of 
concrete disputes， simi1ar cases must be sett1ed similarly. The 
guarantee of equal pI悦 ectionof law， that is “All of the people 
are equal under the law'and there shall be no' discrimination in 
political， economic or social relations because of race， creed， sex， 
social status or family origin. (the Constitution: art. 14，par. 1) 
and the' guarantee: of due process of law (the Constitution: att. 
31) are the two great points of judicature of the democratic society. 
Thereforea legal rule‘w hich is a' major 'premise of legal syllogisIil 
cannot but naturally appear as an abstract hypothetic proposition 
as of“If there are such' and such facts， such and such e百ects.wil1
be. born ". At the. same tiIne this assures predictabi1ity of legal、
life; in other words it canむepredicted beforehand' how a. case 
should be settled， ifit took place， and also' this in good for the safety 
of legal dealings and the prevention of legal disputes. Application 
of law is to apply a legal rule as a' major premise to acknowledged 
fact at the settlement of a concrete case. If we apply a. legal 
rule which is a major premises， tothese lacts of minor premises the 
conc1usion which is got from legal 'syllogism as' its "logica:lIy 
inevitable result is namely decision， especial1y. judgemen:t.、 Nowa 
civi1 dispute. is a quarrel about the ex:istence or non-existence 、of
legal right and duty， which are given as legal effects in the 
construction of legal rule. Buf as Tuhr said，“Niemand hat .je ein 
Rechtgesehen "， a dispute about the existence or non-existence of 
legai right and duty which is the chief subject of civil suits reduces 
to a dispute about， the existence Or non-existence of legal facts 
composing、legaIconditi'ons， in which the Iegal right and duty in 
dispute are contained a:s IegaI e百ects. Apart from admissedfacts， 
about the. existence 01' non-existences of disputed facts， minutely 
speaking， the' truth of factual allegations， the court of justice must 
judge it by free .conviction considering the whole pt 
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is called a f1'ee conviction， and a fact acknowledged 'by it~'becomes 
a 'mino1' 'premise in legal syl1ogiSiIl. On othe1' words， the existence 
ornon-existence of lega1. right and duty can not be recognized by 
the actions of ou1' five senses， but afte1' al1 it should be 1'ecognized 
only th1'ough legal facts， judging f~om the st1'uctu1'e of .1egal 1'ule. 
All legal facts a1'e the facts to be 1'ecognized， by ou1'五ve'senses.: 
although . the1'e may be the‘ diffe1'ence of degree about di伍culty
of 1'eco匡nition. (bona .五des，.mala fides. and f1'audulent wi1.) 
Acco1'dingly in a conc1'ete case， al of the existence of' disputed 
facts can be， and cannot but be ackhowledged by evidences. 
Now it wi1 be a question if decision is limited to such judg-
ing by 1'ecognition 01' 1'easoning， 01' if it contains the action of 
wi11 beside judging; Apa1't f1'om that，' if the settlement of a 
CO'ncrete cs.se we1'e given by the use. of legal syllogism， a judges' 
duty would be ve1'y simple like an' automatic machine of sale， and 
at the mo坑， would only be a 1ittle di部cultat the acknowledge-
ment of facts; for if he only acknowledged facts，. the conc1usion 
would be given in logical necessity， as it were mechanically. But 
is the decision really such a thing? Montesquieu said surely that 
a judge is “la bouche qui prononce les pa1'oles 'de .1a loi， .， (L'esp1'it 
de loi，) and the wo1'd .decision " is “Rechtsprechung" in German， 
which means “to tel1 the law 勺or“tospeakin the court. ")白 The
fo1'mer was spoken， however， for the purpose of assurance of funda-
metal human 1'ights against a1'bit1'ary decisions in the Middle Ages， 
and the latte1' wou1d have been born with the background of 
finding of la w by court assembly (“dinggenossenschaft1iche Rechts-
五ndung")in the 01d German Age. Accol'ding to changes of. 
times the points may di旺ervariously， but there must be something 
beyond the changes concerning the settle'ment of dvi1 disputes. 
It is what function decision has; and f1'om this standpoint， decision 
is 1'equireq to be coccretely p1'ope1'， as it is the settlement of 
conc1'ete disputes. What is concrete propriety' of decission. is a 
di伍cultquestion which cannot be discussed briefiy. Supposing 
decision must be concretely p1'oper， whether it can be attained， 01' 
can be assured to be attained by above mentioned legalsyl10gism 
is not only questionable but also impossible. 'It is because legal 
rule and fact which receives app1ication of' it are di妊erentin 
dimension， and are under the contrary fates. If 1 say so， 1 
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not mean that as legal rule. is not a law of natUre but a law 
of worth， we cannot help permiting violation of law. What 1 want 
to say is that legal rule generally static under written law，on the 
contrary， fact is dynamic. Minutely speaking， itis as follows.. Law 
is an outward and compulsory norm of human society， ofwhich 
O'rder it keeps as well as the standards o:f re1igion， mora1ity and 
customs， a∞ompanying the fact that men are destined to keep 
sociaI Iife. Bnt under written Iaw， Iegal ru1es are made generally 
as mens' conscious works called statutes; and since a code is 
formed and takeseffect through legal process， itis only a 1ifeless 
thing written on the paper in itself. On the contrary， a fact 
which receives app1icatio、nof legal rule is a part of continually 
changing social 1ife~ Therefore we cannot help saying it is 
impossible for us to settle a living thing with a 1ifeless thing. Of 
course， legislators may sometimes make mistakes as they are 
mortal. But even if they formed a complete code as a legislation， 
expecting. every cisputes which might happen in future， a回 se
which they could not imagine might take place， or a Iegal rule 
which could give conc1etely proper settlement at :first， might become 
unable to ful:fil its function as time goes by. Because social 1ife 
is al ways developping without stopping for a moment. Then， on 
the one hand statute cannot entirely deny the e妊ectsof customary 
law， although there may be the di百erenceof degree， in which it 
ackowledges them， on the other hand the interpretation of legal 
rule becomes an important question in order to make a decision 
concretely proper. As for as we use legal syl1ogism， for the 
purpose of altering a decision of its conc1usion， ifwe only change 
legal rules of major premises or facts of minor premises we may 
get a di旺erentconc1usion in logical necessity， comparing with 
the cases when we use no such altering. Another standard Is 
necessary in order to judge if the conc1ussion got by applying 
legal rules without interpretting them wi1 be concretely proper 
as the settlement a case; and after a1 it wi1 be judges' view of 
life. 1n case the conc1usion is decided not to be concretely proper， 
judges may get a concr・etelyproper decision as they expect， ifthey 
interp1'et legal rules as majo1' p1'emises by enlarging， restrictive 
01' contrary interpretations. Of course， they do not choose a con. 
cretely proper decision for the acknowledged facts among several 
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conc1usions. In the presence of a concrete case， judges wi1l get 
its settlement without through logical process of legal syllogism， or 
as an extreme case， they wi1l get it intuitively before they acknow-
ledge facts; and they wi1l interpret legal rules according this 
settlement， and at the same time wi1 acknowledge facts connecting 
them with legal rules. of major premises. Interpretation of law 
is a technic to dra w a concretely proper decision out of logicof 
syllogism， so that it does not mean such an explanatory provision 
teaching spirit at the bottom of law as the Civi1 Code: Art. lb， 
par.2-“This law shal1 be interpreted with principle of indivi-
dual dignity and the essential equality of the sexes." Interpretation 
of la w is variously discussed， for instance research after legislators' 
wi1， or research for the wi1 of law， sti1 more grammatical 
interpretation or logical interpretation. In short， its principal object 
is to get concretely pJ・operdecision as the settlement of civi1 
disputes at each time and each place. Accordingly a legal rule 
should be interpreted in the lapse of history， moreover 1imitedness 
and unlimitedness of interpretation of law is discussed， and this 
question wi1l be related with such problems as completeness and 
defect of law. It is also connected withthe question of五nding
of law. 
Because a code is mens' conscious work， there may be some 
defects from the beginning of its legislation， which were not 
known by legislators， or even a complete code at the time of 
legislation may bring fo1'・thdefects with changes of society. At 
any rate we have to. recognize that a code accompanies SOme 
defects. Now it may be said that law is complete in itself， and 
what is defective is only a code. But jUdges cannot refuse the 
decision of civil cases for the reason .()f defects of law， so that if 
there is any defect in a code they must五ndnatually a legal rule 
as the standard for settling the dispute. Judges must五ndlegal 
rule not only in the case of defect of a code but also al ways 
about the settlement of disputes in the五eldof law of ob1igations 
because in present private law， especially in such field， the Civil 
Code itself acknowledges the principle 、offreedom of contract to 
a Iarge extent， and leaves mutual1egal relations among individuals 
to the agreement of their mutual wi1s. It wi1 be also a question 
whether substantial law is the standard of conduct or that of 
decision but it is no doubt tha 
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the same time a side of the standard of decision at the sett1ement 
of disputes. When 1 say五ndingof la w here， 1 mean the standard 
of decision not that of conduct. Of cou1'se， judges cannot五nd
legal rules without relation to facts. When they use the diEcovered 
legal I・uleas the standard of the settlement of a dispute， under 
the prerent code of civi1 procedure， they should take reasoning 
l1lethod "of "legal syllogism， in the form of ordering clause and 
statements of the g1'ounds of decision， just as they do in the case 
of using written law as the standard. As it were， they take the 
method of application of law， applying the discovered legal rule to 
ncknowledged facts as a major premise. The reason why judges 
should take such a method is the subject which Ehrlich tried to 
make clear especially in his “Juristische Logik". Apart from that， 
when decision has no ground of it or there are some inconsistency 
among its grounds， needless to say， the g1'ound of revision is 
aclmowledged. Now violation of law by decision which generally 
forrns ground of revision. is mentioned as “No application 01' 
unproper' application of legal rule shall be violation of la w." (old 
Code of Civi1 Procedure: Art. 435.) The so-cal1ed legal rule should 
be considered to include not only legal rules in written law， 
customary law and case-law， but also 1'ules which are found by 
judges for the sett1ement of concrete cases. At the sarne time 
this wiU have the meaning of establishing the system of“decision 
by law，" as assurance of fu:ndamental human rights against 
nrbitrary decision in the Middle Ages. At any rate， since judges 
are not permitted to reject decision about civi1 cases， they should 
keep the following rule. “In the absence of an applicable written 
-la w for decision of a civi1 case， the jUdge shall decide according 
to custom， and in default. thereof by infering reason and justice:' 
as is wonderfully said in NO.103 Law (Directions of Administration 
of Justice): Art. 3， which .was proclaimed by the Great Counci1 of 
State (Dajδgwan) on June 8th :in 1875. The so-cal1ed inference of 
reason and justice is nothing but finding of law in question. In 
short its principle is as providedin Swiss Civi1 Code :Al't. 1， 
“The .1a w govel'ns al1 cases coming within the letter 01' the spirit 
of any of its prov:isions. In theabsence of an applicable provision 
of law， the.judge shall decide according to customary law， and 
in . default thereof according to the 1'ules which he would lay d 
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if he had to act as legislator.'He shall be guided by solutions 
sanctioned by legal doctrine and case-law." 
The question of source of law is taken up in the meaning of 
aCknowledging material of law. Legal right and duty are laws 
'made conCrete according .to concrete cases， a:p.d moreover they are 
:¥vorth their names for the 缶詰 timew hen '.their existence is 
acknowledged' by the final jUdgement in the 、，court.of justice. 
After al what is cal1ed the question of source of law should be 
said the守 problemconcerning settlement of disputes， especial1y 
standard of decision. It may be considered that such standard of 
.settling disputes is la w， minutely speaking legal rule or standard ()f 
decision forming a major premise of legal syl1ogism. As the legal 
ru1es in such meaning， thel'・eare case-law， reason ，and justice 
besides written law and customary law. It is a di伍cultquestion 
what reason.and justice is. In short it is reason of. society which 
is necessarily drawn out of such 'human destiny as human life does 
not existapart from society， and which>rules the time and the 
place according to function of law that is the standard giving 
external and forcible order to social life. Besides the question 
whether' legal doctrine is also recognized. as source of law is 
answered by many negative. opinions. .But it is no doubt that 
legal doctrine is taken as the standard of decision as is provided 
in Swiss Civi1 Code; Art. 1. JU1・ist-law.includes what may be 
，called law of doctrine besides case.law 01' jUdge.made luw. ，At 
present when written law has develapped to a，'high degree， legal 
.doctrine . has meaning only about .interpretation of written law; 
but there we1'e times w hen it had an important meaning as source 
of 1a w and fu1五1edits function， as we see in .1'esponsa. pruden-
，tjum1) in Roman'law 01' Aktensendung"J for unive1'sities in German 
-“allgemeines Recht" 
III 
Accol'・dingto legal syllogism， there are many legal rules forming 
major premises， such as written law， customary law，case-law and 
;reasoi1-1aw. If these legal rules are app1ied to acknowledged facts 
1) Response of jurists. 
2) Asking or opinion by sending records， 
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or admissed facts which are minor premu::es， the conc1usion is 
given in logical necessity; 80 that legal syllogism is nothing but 
a deductive method. (In concrete cases， there are usually acknow-
ledged facts and admissed one in the facts to be applied to legal 
facts. which make up a legal condition.) The questic.n is what 
applicationof law means essential1y_ As 1 said before， legal rule 
forming a major premise in legal syllogism and fact forming a 
minor premise in it are different in dimension，fo士oneis static 
and the other is dynamic. Therefore even if settlement of disputes， 
especially decision has to take such syllogism formally， we should 
児島ctifeverything is settled by syl10gism of a mere form of 
thought or logic. Actual social life is too complicated to be 
given order by legal rules. If 1 do not refer to doctrines of 
historical jUrisprudence， the question whether law is made 01' 
born is an important problem 1'elating to the basis of law. There 
are enough reasons for the 1'equirement of reasoning form of legal 
syllogism about settlement of civi1 disputes， especially decision. 
But what shows great characteristic against Continental law~ 
especially against this deductive method under the principle of 
written law is inductive method under the principle of unwritten 
law as in Anglo・Americanla w. In common la w a .case has binding 
force as precedent， w hich is the la w found by a judge for the 
purpose of settHng a' concrete case; so that commc.n la w is nothing 
but so-called judge-made law. On earth，is law given， or is it 
born? As for the primitiveform of law there were times when 
it was thought to be given by god， which' consideration was for 
the' sake of securing authority of decision namely of law. The 
form of decision responding it is cal日isma討tic五nd出ing0ぱflaw 
(“kalisma討tischeRecht白S五ndung"
its authority for the outward and superト.占h1包lmanpower. Men were 
born， lived and died in those primitive times too， so that. from 
their fatal fact that they form society， laws were naturally born 
as things to give order to it. In other. words， law is born iIi social 
life which is ruled by it and the necessity of social life brings 
forth law. Nowa civi1 dispute is a section of social life. There. 
fore the law for sett1ing disputes natural1y exists as a 'department 
of law. Looking back upon history of decision we find that present 
written Ia w has come into existence since the age of codification 
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according to the develGpment of modern states and that there was 
only decision in former times. Minutely speaking， wheロvi1agers
were玄oingto settle a concrete. a百air，even though they seeked 
the standard for super~human authority of an Oracle， sti1 they 
found the settlement by themselves. When a simi1ar case took 
place afterwards， they settled it according to the settlementof 
the former case which had been handed down by word of month 
among old vi1agers. They did EO according to their fee1ingof 
justice that simi1ar casesshould be settled simi1arly_ (The same 
case does not Occur twice.) The more such cases were simi1arly 
settled one after anotlier， the more the standard assumed quality 
of rule， losing concretei1ess of concrete a旺airs. So that these rules 
were handed down among some vi1agers， and were brought up 
whenever an a百airtook place. They were written down and 
editted according to discovery of letters and inventicn of printing， 
and further they became to havethe form of code which is seen 
in the countries of written-law， according to the development of 
modern states. Therefore written law is nothing but congelation 
of precedents of decision. It is significant that the first books of 
・law，such as Twelve Tables， Le玄 Salicaand some others were al 
the editiorts of :trecedents of decision. At the same time most of 
the laws written in these books of law are modes of procedure. 
This . also tells that decision precMes la w both in time and in 
logic， inopposition to the principle of present written law， just 
as Roman law is said to have no .system oflegal right， but have 
only the system of Actio. Now after the age of calismatic finding 
of law，五ndingof law by court-assembly(“dinggenossenschaft1iche 
Rechtsfindung ") is recognized， which form is seen about Roman 
law， but is found in purer form about German law. Centumviri 
and decemviri in Roman la w were the courts consisted of men 
who were elected from commonpeople. Intimes of formulary 
procedure too， in brder to receive the judex's judgement， the 
.praetor's formula was necessary previous to it， but the jUdex 
himself was also eleded from people. The necessity of formula 
is just the same with that of a writ in equity. Further in German 
.1aw， at五.rstal立1vi1agers having a certain qual日i五cat世ionhad a 
assembly ('‘“Ding .，
nes岱sa討tthe ιsame time.. As society became complicated on the 
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one hand， and sovereIgnty was enlarged on the other， law-advisors 
(Rachineburgi or Sacebarone) were elected frorn. people; and also 
experts of law (rnen who learned Rornan law going abroad to 
the Bologna University and so on in Italy) were appointed law-
speakel's (Richter) 'by the king. The court， which was cornposed 
'of宅thoselaw-advisors (Urteiler).and law-speakers becarne to settle 
disputes. But settlernent of dispute itself was entirely the question 
‘of the whole vi1age. So that even in this age， although vi1lagers 
hn.ving a certain quali五cationdid not assurne the duty of co-
operating in the adrninistration of justice (“Dingpflicht ") 'unlike 
in the previous age， sti1 they could attend the rneeting (“Urnstand") 
and rnake 'contrary. proposals {)f. decision ag;:tinst la w-advisors' 
proposal of decision. If they did not corne to agreernent about 
the question which proposal of decision should be taken out of 
rnOre than tw仏 theydecided it by. a duel in the end. At any 
rate， in order to forrn a decision and give e百ectto it as the settle-
rnent of a civi1 dispute，. it was necessary for. the law-speaker to 
take up "the pl'・oposalof decision and proclairn it the decision 
'(" Rechtsprechenぺ) Nedless to say， the .systern of appeal as. seen 
at present was not recognized under such construction. . The 
contrary proposal of decision ful五ledfunction of appeal. . 1 shall 
add that there was Hundred-Court about Gerrnan la w too. The 
Anglo-Saxons belonging to the Gerrnan race. ruled then Celts and 
'then the Norrnans' that were also a part of the German race 
conquered.the former， leaded' by Wil1iarn. . Accordingly the systern 
of“dinggenossenschaftliche Rechts五ndung"of Gerrnan ，1aw which 
had above-rnentioned construction' was brought to Englnad aCI"oss 
the Straits' of Dover， where it developped in cornparatively pure 
forrn being separated 'by the Straits，' judging frorn the degree of 
developrnent of the rneans of communication at that tirne. Cornmon 
'law is 'nothing but its product. There is Brunners' minute study 
about the orIgin of jurysystern. Can .we not say that the systern 
of“dinggenossenschaftliche' Rechtsfindung" in German law deve-
lopped into' jury systern in England， and brought forth “Schむ百en"
system 'in Getrriany?・Atany fate under “dinggenossenschaftliche 
Rechtsfindung" the standard was always found by people: or law-
‘advisbis' who were elected frorn people， inorder to settle' .concrete 
cases，' and law-speakers' proclamation of law~ narnely deci 
APPLICATION AND FINDING OF LAW 11 
ratified， as it were， the sett1ement by discovered legal l'ules. Such 
a way of settling disputes js inductive， and not deductive as in 
present legal syl1ogism. The binding force of precedent in comrnon 
law should be understood under the background of such history. 
In this rneaning judicial legislation is said in Anglo-American 
law.、Itis necessary for us to l'emember thatdiscovered laws are 
al ways living la ws. 
Now application means cornparison; and in the case. of appli-
cation of law， law and acknowledged fact is compared. But 
comparison is only possible arnong things of the same dimension， 
that is on the same plane. If weregard la w as a given thing， 
.we cannot compare such static la w and changeful dynamic social 
life， because they are different indirnension. The application of 
the former to the latter is impossible by nature. Thus said Sauer， 
and discussed as fol1ows. On the one hand abstract la w is made 
concrete in some degree according to concrete a百airs，on the other 
in connection with that， concrete social facts are made abstract 
in. some deg:ree， in the meaning that the factshaving legal 
meanings are taken up， and the facts without such meaning are 
cast aside. As it were， when materializing of things above and 
abstracting of things below concur on a plane， for the缶詰 time
they can be compared， and applicationof law is done. The law 
to be applied at the spot .of the concurrence of both is not 
abstract law itself before the application， but is. materialized in 
some degree according to concrete a妊airs. Sauer called this 
standard “konkrete Gestaltungsnorm" according to his view of 
suit that it is “ Sachgestaltung:~ (“Juristische Methodenlehre ") 
Ehr lich also spoke. of“konkrete Entscheidungsnorm" only once 
in his “Grundlegung der Soziologie‘des Rechts." According to 
his opinion thatlaw is born from reallife of society， sothat白there
is no di百erencebetween so-called questions of la w and questions 
of fact， his ‘“‘konkr閃et旬eEnts詑cheidungsno肘rm"is namely Saue白r司.'
“konkrαre抗teGes武，tal託t江1ngsnorrn"and both of them are the very livlng 
laws which form the standard to settle concrete cases. Accol'ding 
to the doctrine of stare decisis in common law， itis about ratio 
decidendei that a case has binding force aS a law， and obiter 
dictum which is related by the judge inno connection withthe 
settlement of the a百airhas not. such power. The ratio decidendei 
is nothing but Ehrl 
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“konkrete Gestaltungsnorm， and each of them is living la w itself. 
Therefore no matter whether the form of legal syllogism is taken 
or not， and without regard to the principle of written law or that 
of unwritten law， the standard of sett1ing disputes is always 
living law. The organs of settling disputes， such as jUdges， con-
si1iators and arbitrators always have to五ndliving la ws， and 
usual1y they are :finding them in order to settle disputes. 1 suppose 
五ndingof law has been thought as follows until now. Though 
judges take formally the form of application of law by sy116gIsm， 
in case there is no written law， customary law， 01' case-law as a 
major p1'emise， they must fOT the五rsttime五nda law to be the 
standard for settling the dispute. But it is not true， and 1 must 
say application of law is namely :finding of law. In other words， 
not only when there is no applicable law in written law， customary 
law and case-law， but also when the laws inc1uded in these source 
of law are used， they a1'e not always applied to facts as they are. 
The settlement of dispute would be impos~ible if詑 werenot for 
:finding of living laws in the meaning as Sauer thought， that for 
the purpose of settling concrete . affairs， according to them， legal 
1'ules are made conc1'ete in some degree. The living la w should 
be born and taken out of facts of disputes. At缶詰 itis useful 
as the standard to settle the concrete case， but afterwards it wi1l 
become that for sett1ing later a百airsas a part of case-law. By 
and by it is made more abstract， as it were， cryatal1ized and it 
may happen to be taken into written law. Thus a new living law 
is al ways found through the same course. 
If we think in this way， we cannot but say that application 
of law under the principle of written law and application of law 
under the principle of unwritten law have not such different 
characters as are thought， but they are just the same in essence 
as settlement of civi1 disputes. The doctrine of stare decisisseems 
to be something new and unfami1iar for us who are accustomed 
to the way of thougnt of.' ContinentaI la w. But we too are 
usually五ndingliving laws as ratio decidendei， although undel' 
written Iaw， inorder to settle civi1 disputes.αcourse， capricious 
settlement cannot be permitted about the settlement by compromise 
agreement， conci1iation and a ward， though it is not the settleinent 
by law， and五ndingof 1iving law is required for stronger reason 
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comparing with the case under written legal rule. The di百erence
between compulsory settlement by decision and voluntary settle-
ment by these is only whether restriction is or is not about 
五ndingof living law. In voluntary settlement which is not 
restrained by written la w，五ndingof living la w is di伍cultall the 
more. 
IV 
The law which gives order to our present society is civi1 law 
according to it being the civi1 society.But internationallaw and 
labour law are developping， which are di妊erentfrom civi1 la w in 
dimension， and accordingly accompany the sence di妊erentfrom 
that of civi1 la w. Let alone those， since the society in which we 
live is the civi1 one， and the law ruling it is civi1 law，。缶cersof 
the court， especially jUdges must be thoroughly com~dous that 
they are organs of settling disputes in the civi1 society， even 
though present court is kept by expense号ofthe五scas jUdicial 
organs of state and jUdges forming it are made national public 
o伍cers，and that of special work. Present judges possess， as詑
were， both functions of a law-advisor and a 1aw-speaker who were 
distinguished concretely about German la w. This circumstances 
is the same about conci1iators. and arbitrators who dea1 with 
voluntary settlement by compromise agreement， conci1iation and 
award. If the judges' ignorance of the world (“Weltfremdheit ") 
or his fossi1ization should happen， itis because he loses concious. 
ness that he is the organs of settling disputes in the civi1 society. 
Thus the code of civi1 procedure is also the 1aw for sett1ing 
disputes in the civi1 society. For instance， itis unreasonable by 
nature to make use of provisional orders (“einstwei1ge Verfueg-
ungen ") which are formed for disputes in the civi1 society， inorder 
to settle disputes il1 the labour soeiety which is di妊erentfrom 
civil one in dimension， and should develop rather deriying it. For 
this purpose a system as of 1abour injunction should be made. 
At present acknowledgment of fact is left to free conviction of 
the court， and moreover “All judges shal1 be independent in the 
exercise of theil' conscience and shall be bound only by this 
Constitution and the laws." (the Constitution: Art. 76， par. 3.) 
Free conviction means to set judges free from restraint by 1a w 
14 TSUNE ONOGi 
concerning acknowledgment' of fact， contrari1y to the principle of 
legal evidence， and iI1dipendence of jurisdiction means to free 
thern from' outward. oppressionconcerning the use of jurisdiction; 
and these two aie very reasonable in守themselves. But as free 
conviction and judges'conscience are，mentioned， their duties 
become all the more important and great. Especially in the present 
wor1d where right and left are strongly opposed to each other， 
jUdges wil1 have great hardship in order to keep their conscience 
fair. We ought to suppose how di缶cultis to be worth a good 
judge. 
Now a civi1' dispute is the opposition of interests. As far as 
both of the parties concerned to the dispute are di旺erentin their 
standpoints in. their consCIousness， the dimensions or the planes 
w here they stand upon al'e di妊erent. So that in order to settle 
the dispute， itis necessary for a judge to. stand upon higher 
dimension or plane， denying the' standpoints of both sides. The 
circumstances are the same abo悦 no任 jUdicialagreements: When 
a dispute is settled by the non-judicial agreement， the parties 
concerned to' the dispute deny in their consciousness their stand-
points until then， and standupon the higher and common stand-
point. About compulsory sett1ement and voluntary one of disputes 
too，. particularly about the latter， jUdges，' conci1iators and 
arbitrators 、whodeal in the settlementshould mind this point. 
Of course， where the principle of pleading is taken， the， jUdge 
himself should not voluntati1y bl'ing both parties concerned to such 
highdimension byhis authority. But as for decision when a suit' 
is“formed" to such a degree， itbecomes' ripe for decision 
(ヤspruchreif")for the f1rst time. Even， if1 do not refer to“ami-
cable settlement" which isrecognized by the Code of Procedure 
of Personal Suit， we ought not: to overlook that lapse of time 
performs a great operation on this point especial1y in voluntary 
settlement， a:s'it is called “the tutelar god of time." This question 
may belong to the question of legal psychology， but 1 should like 
to point ont that this point also has a very important meaning 
in ordel' to get concretely proper settlement， if1 say from the 
point of cOl1sciousness of the parties concerned to th色dispute.
1 have explained frankly what 1 think at present about the 
question of application and五ndingof la w. In short， the conc1usion 
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is that at thesettlement of civi1 disputes，五ndingof law is always 
done under the mask of application of law. A statute has the 
mission to make present social life approach to the ideal socieiy 
step by step. So that even if 1 c1aim such a conclusion. 1 never 
mean that we shouldignore the ideal of law， for instance， that 
we should take up as living law， rules among good-for.-nothings as 
they are. But 1 want to emphasize that when ~e ， find living law 
according to concrete cases， we are given concretely proper 
settlement for the first time. Creative function of decision lies in 
true meaning upon the point of五ndingof living law. For the 
sake of this， the thought of social engineering which was said by 
pound may be necessary. It is reasonable that the studies of 
scholars who belong to “freie Rechtswissenschaft， "“Interessen -
jurisprudenz" and sociology of law have decision as their chief 
point. If 1 mention their names， there are“Recherche libre 
scientifique " by Jeny，“Entscheidungsnorm" by Isay，“Fallrecht " 
by Heck，“Richte主recht"by Danz，“Theory of Judicial Decisions" 
by Pound，・ Nature of Judicial Process" by Cardozo， and besides 
Sauer's“konkrete Gestalungsnorm" and Ehrlich's "konkrete 
Entscheidungsnorm" which 1 mentioned above. 
1 add in the end that on arranging my thought， 1 was greatly 
enlightened by Ehrlich's“Grundlegung der Soziologie des Rechts" 
and Weber's“Rechtssoziologie，" though 1 did not quote them in 
each case. 
